EXTERNAL EMERGENCY PLAN
PUBLIC VERSION

European Refreshments t/a Ballina Beverages

Killala Road
Ballina
Co. Mayo

2018

PROMULGATION

The External Emergency Plan for European Refreshments, Killala Road, Ballina, developed pursuant to the European Communities (Control of Major Accident Hazards Involving Dangerous Substances) Regulations 2015 (SI 209 of 2015) is promulgated on behalf of the Local Competent Authorities by the following:

Joseph McKenna.

Date: December 2018

Supt. Joseph McKenna
On behalf of An Garda Síochána, Mayo Division

Kay Kennington.

Date: December 2018

Ms. Kay Kennington
Emergency Management Officer
On behalf of Health Service Executive West

Date: December 2018

Mr. Conor Lynch
Senior Assistant Chief Fire Officer
On behalf of Mayo County Council

TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPENDICES

ISSUE OF PLAN & RECORD OF EXERCISES

Record of Issue

Issue Number	Date	Description
1	March 2015	First issue.
2	November 2018	Updated to reflect the Chemicals Act (Control of Major Accident Hazards Involving Dangerous Substances) Regulations 2015 and to revise the major accident hazard scenarios.

Record of Exercises

Exercise Type	Date	Description
Live exercise	11th April 2014	Live exercise to test and validate the External Emergency Plan, in particular the initial response procedures of the principal response agencies.
TableTop Exercise	28th November 2017	TableTop exercise to test and validate the External Emergency Plan and designed to determine the PRA's knowledge of the particular protocols for the site and also to promote co-ordination and co-operation between the agencies involved.

PUBLICATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF PLAN

A copy of this plan is distributed to the following agencies / organisations:

Agency / Organisation	Issued to:
An Garda Síochána, Mayo Division	Chief Superintendent
Health Service Executive West	Regional Emergency Management Office
Mayo County Council	Chief Executive
European Refreshments	Health and Safety Manager
Health and Safety Authority	Chief Executive
Environmental Protection Agency	Director General

This plan is a controlled document. The Local Competent Authorities will, as required, update the plan and redistribute to the above list. Printed copies or photocopies of the plan are only controlled and guaranteed valid up to and on the date of printing.

Individual agencies should print sufficient copies for distribution to the relevant personnel within their agency / organisation.

It is requested that careful consideration is given to the distribution of the plan within your organisation as some of the information contained in the plan is security sensitive.

Public Access Version of Plan

A public access version of the External Emergency Plan intended for broad dissemination is available at the following locations:

- www.mayococo.ie
- Area Managers Office, Health Service Executive, First Floor, St. Mary's Headquarters, Castlebar, Co. Mayo
- Ballina Garda Station, Lord Edward Street, Ballina, Co. Mayo
- Mayo Fire Service, Fire Brigade HQ, Humbert Way, Castlebar, Co. Mayo

The public access version of the plan includes the entire External Emergency Plan except contact details and other security sensitive information. The information omitted has no bearing on the overall plan.

TERMS & DEFINITIONS

Term & Definition	Description
Ambulance Loading Point / Area	An area close to the Casualty Clearing Station where casualties are transferred to ambulances for transport to hospital.
Casualty Clearing Station	The area established at the site by the ambulance service, where casualties are collected, triaged, treated and prepared for evacuation.
Central Competent Authority	The Health and Safety Authority (HSA) as defined by the Chemicals Act (Control of Major Accident Hazards Involving Dangerous Substances) Regulations, SI 209 of 2015. It is the authority with responsibility for ensuring compliance with the regulations.
COMAH Regulations	European Communities (Control of Major Accident Hazards Involving Dangerous Substances) Regulations, SI 74 of 2006.
Consultation Distance	A distance or area relating to an establishment, within which there are potentially significant consequences for human health or the environment from a major accident at the establishment, including potentially significant consequences for developments such as residential areas, buildings and areas of public use, recreational areas and major transport routes. This area is advised from the Central Competent Authority to the Planning Authority.
Controller of Operations	The person given authority by a principal response agency to control all elements of its activities at and about the site. The officer in command of the initial response of each principal emergency service should be the principal response agency's Controller of Operations until relieved through the agency's pre-determined process.
Cordons	The designated perimeters of an emergency site, with a Traffic Cordon, an Outer Cordon, an Inner Cordon and a Danger Area Cordon, as appropriate.
Danger Area	An area where there is a definite risk to rescue personnel, over and above that which would normally pertain at emergency operations.
Dangerous Substance	A substance or mixture covered by Part 1 of Schedule 1 or listed in Part 2 of Schedule 1 of the COMAH Regulations, including in the form of a raw material, product, by-product, residue or intermediate.
Framework for Major Emergency Management	A framework enabling the principal response agencies to prepare for and make a co-ordinated response to major emergencies resulting from events such as fires, transport accidents, hazardous substance incidents and severe weather.
Holding Area	An area to which resources and personnel, which are not immediately required, are directed to await deployment.

Incident Control Point	The place on-site from which the principal response agencies will control, direct and co-ordinate their organisations response to the emergency. The Initial Incident Control Point is located at the Gatehouse inside the main entrance gate to European Refreshments.
Lead Agency	The principal response agency that is assigned the responsibility and mandate for the co-ordination function.
Local Competent Authorities	An Garda Síochána, the Health Service Executive and the relevant Local Authority as defined by the Chemicals Act (Control of Major Accident Hazards Involving Dangerous Substances) Regulations, SI 209 of 2015.
Major Accident	An occurrence such as a major emission, fire, or explosion resulting from uncontrolled developments in the course of the operation of any establishment covered by the Chemicals Act (Control of Major Accident Hazards Involving Dangerous Substances) Regulations 2015, and leading to serious danger to human health or the environment, immediate or delayed, inside or outside the establishment, and involving one or more dangerous substances. (Defined by the Chemicals Act (Control of Major Accident Hazards Involving Dangerous Substances) Regulations, SI 3209 of 2015.)
Major Accident Hazard Scenario	This is an undesirable event or sequence of events that could lead to a major accident.
Major Emergency	Any event which, usually with little or no warning, causes or threatens death or injury, serious disruption of essential services, or damage to property, the environment or infrastructure beyond the normal capabilities of the principal emergency services in the area in which the event occurs, and requiring the activation of specific additional procedures to ensure effective, co-ordinated response.
Major Emergency Management	The range of measures taken under the five stages of emergency management, i.e. hazard analysis and risk assessment, mitigation / risk management, planning and preparedness, co-ordinated response and recovery.
Major Emergency Plan	A plan prepared by one of the principal response agencies.
On-site Co-ordinator	The person from the lead agency (Controller of Operations) with the role of co-ordinating the activities of all agencies responding to an emergency.
On-Site Co-Ordination Group	A group that includes the On-site Co-ordinator, the Controllers of Operations of the other PRA's, representatives from European Refreshments and others as appropriate. This group will initially convene at the Gatehouse inside the main entrance gate to European Refreshments.
On-Site Co-Ordination Point	Specific facility where the On-site Co-ordinator is located and the On-site Co-ordination Group meet. The Initial On-site Co-Ordination Point is located at the Gatehouse inside the main entrance gate to European Refreshments.

Public Information Zone (PIZ)	The zone referred to in Regulation 25(4), (called the 'specified area' in the previous regulations (SI 74 of 2006)) for which the operator shall ensure that all that all persons likely to be affected by a major accident originating at that establishment receive regularly and in the most appropriate form, without having to request it, clear and intelligible information on safety measures and requisite behaviour in the event of a major accident.
Principal Response Agencies (PRA's)	The agencies designated by the Government to respond to Major Emergencies i.e. An Garda Síochána, the Health Service Executive and the Local Authorities.
Rendezvous Point (RVP)	The Rendezvous Point is the location to which all resources responding to the emergency site are directed to in the first instance. An Garda Síochána will organise the Rendezvous Point. Other services may have a Marshalling Officer present to direct responding vehicles into action or to the designated Holding Area.
Seveso Site	Industrial sites that, because of the presence of dangerous substances in sufficient quantities, are regulated under Council Directive 2012/18/EU, commonly referred to as the Seveso III Directive. The Seveso Directive is implementation in Ireland through the Chemicals Act (Control of Major Accident Hazards Involving Dangerous Substances) Regulations, SI 209 of 2015 and the Planning and Development Acts 2000-2015 and Regulations 2001-2015.
Upper Tier Seveso Establishment	An establishment where dangerous substances are present in quantities equal to or in excess of the quantities listed in Column 3 of Part 1 or in Column 3 of Part 2 of Schedule 1, where applicable using the summation rule laid down in note 4 to Schedule 1, of the Chemicals Act (Control of Major Accident Hazards Involving Dangerous Substances) Regulations, SI 209 of 2015.

INTRODUCTION

European Union Directive, Council Directive 2012/18/EU on the Control of Major Accident Hazards applies to industrial establishments where dangerous substances are held in quantities above specified threshold limits.

The aim of the Directive, referred to as Seveso III, is the prevention of major accidents involving dangerous substances and the limitation of the consequences for humans and the environment if such accidents occur.

The Directive, implemented in Ireland under the Chemicals Act (Control of Major Accident Hazards Involving Dangerous Substances) Regulations 2015 (COMAH Regulations), requires operators handling dangerous substances above specified thresholds, categorised as Upper Tier Seveso Establishments, to provide safety reports, implement a safety management system and establish internal emergency plans.

European Refreshments t/a Ballina Beverages, Killala Road, Ballina is classified as an Upper Tier Seveso Establishment. The establishment is engaged in the manufacture of beverage concentrates and beverage bases.

In accordance with the COMAH Regulations, this External Emergency Plan has been prepared by the Local Competent Authorities (An Garda Síochána, the Health Services Executive and Mayo County Council) in consultation with the operator, Central Competent Authority and Environmental Protection Agency.

The purpose of this plan is to set standard agreed procedures for the effective and co-ordinated response in the event of a major accident or an uncontrolled event which could be reasonably expected to lead to a major accident at European Refreshments.

The plan should be read and implemented in conjunction with:

- The Internal Emergency Plan for European Refreshments
  Note that the European Refreshments Internal Emergency Plan currently in operation was issued in December 2016.

- The Major Emergency Plans of:
  - An Garda Síochána, Mayo Division
  - Health Service Executive West
  - Mayo County Council

In accordance with the relevant regulations, this plan will be reviewed and tested as often as circumstances require, but at a minimum, every 3 years. Any changes at the establishment which would warrant an update to this plan will be notified by European Refreshments to the Health and Safety Authority and the Local Competent Authorities.

SECTION 1 ACTIVATION AND STAND DOWN

1.1 When will the Plan be Activated?

This plan will be activated immediately when:

- A major accident occurs [1]; or
- An uncontrolled event occurs which could be reasonably expected to lead to a major accident.

A major accident is an occurrence, such as a major emission, fire or explosion, resulting from uncontrolled developments in the course of the operation of European Industries, leading to serious danger to human health or the environment, immediate, or delayed, inside or outside the establishment, and involving one or more dangerous substances.

A dangerous substance is defined by the Chemicals Act (Control of Major Accident Hazards Involving Dangerous Substances) Regulations 2015 as a substance or mixture —

(a) Covered by Part 1 of Schedule 1 of the regulations, or
(b) Listed in Part 2 of Schedule 1 of the regulations,

including in the form of a raw material, product, by-product, residue or intermediate.

1.2 Who can Activate the Plan?

The following personnel from European Refreshments are authorised to activate this plan:

- Safety and Loss Prevention Manager
- Engineering Manager
- Operations Manager
- Emergency Duty Manager

This plan can also be activated by the responding emergency services if it appears that a major accident has occurred at the establishment and European Refreshments personnel have not activated it.

[1] The term 'major accident' is used to reflect its usage and definition in the Chemicals Act (Control of Major Accident Hazards Involving Dangerous Substances) Regulations 2015. Note that a "major accident" at a Seveso Upper Tier establishment may not necessarily be of sufficient impact on the capabilities of the emergency services as to require the declaration of a Major Emergency under the Framework for Major Emergency Management.

1.3 Activating the Plan

The designated person from European Refreshments will make a 999 / 112 telephone call to alert the following emergency services:

- **Fire Service:** Mayo Fire Service will be alerted through West Region Fire Control (Camp West) via the 999 / 112 call.
- **Ambulance Control:** National Ambulance Service will be alerted through the National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC) via the 999/112 call.
- **Gardaí:** An Garda Síochána will be altered through Divisional HQ / Communications Centre via the 999 / 112 call.

When making the 999/112 telephone call, the call will be initially be answered by ECSA, the emergency call answering service. The designated caller should ask the call operator to be transferred to each of the emergency services required.

It is the responsibility of the caller to ensure that each of the emergency services required has been contacted.

1.4 Information to be Provided to the Emergency Services

European Refreshments will report the accident/event by providing the following information to each of the Emergency Services

Information to be Provided to the Emergency Services

1. This is ***"state name and position"***.
2. I work for European Refreshments, Killala Road, Ballina, Co. Mayo *(also known as Ballina Beverages).*
3. European Refreshments is an Upper Tier Seveso Site.
4. I wish to inform you that ***"state the type of accident"*** has occurred / is imminent at ***"state exact location"***.
5. I am providing details of the incident using the ETHANE format.

E	Exact Location	Be as specific as possible. Specify building or installation on-site.

T	Type of Incident	Fire, explosion, chemical incident, etc.
H	Hazards	Current and potential.
A	Access	- Access at the main gate on the R314, Killala Road, Ballina. - Specify Rendezvous Point (RVP 1 or RVP 2) based on location of incident and wind direction). - State wind direction.
N	Number of casualties	Number of casualties, type and severity of injuries.
E	Emergency Services	Present and required.

6. I am activating the External Emergency Plan for the establishment.

Note : After finishing with the first emergency service required, WAIT ON THE LINE to speak to the 999 ECAS Operator again by asking "OPERATOR ARE YOU THERE?" Request to be put through to the next emergency service required.

Note : Prior to the arrival of the emergency services on-site, additional relevant information and updates should be communicated to each of the emergency services as it becomes available.

1.5 On Activation of the External Emergency Plan

On activation of the External Emergency Plan, the first response vehicle from An Garda Síochána, the HSE and Mayo Fire Service will convene at the Initial Incident Control Point. All other responding vehicles from the principal response agencies will report to the designated Rendezvous Point.

A representative from Ballina Beverageswill also attend the Initial Incident Control Point to liaise with the principal response agencies.

The Emergency Response Organisation structure and response arrangements for Ballina Beveragesis detailed in their Internal Emergency Plan.

The Initial Incident Control Point is located at the Gatehouse inside the main entrance gate to Ballina Beverageson the R314, Killala Road, Ballina.

Ballina Beveragesand each principal response agency will implement their key actions as outlined in Section 2.

1.6 Management of Emergency Response

The lead agency should be identified and assigned the responsibility and mandate for the co-ordinated function in local emergencies. Each Controller of Operations from the principal response agencies shall command and control the response of their organisation at the establishment. The PRA's will co-operate to implement an inter-agency response.

1.7 Standing Down the Plan

The decision to stand down this plan will be taken by the Controller of Operations of the lead principal response agency in consultation with the Controllers of Operations of the other PRA's and the Emergency Duty Manager from European Refreshments.

Where a Major Emergency has been declared under the Framework for Major Emergency Management, the decision to stand down the incident will be taken by the On-site Co-ordinator in consultation with the Controllers of Operations of the other PRA's and the Local Co-ordination Group.

SECTION 2 KEY ACTIONS

2.1 General

In the event of activation of this plan, European Refreshments and each principal response agency will implement key actions as outlined below.

2.2 Key Actions of European Refreshments

1. Ensure the activation section (Section 1) of this plan is complete.
2. Initiate full site evacuation procedures.
3. Establish communications with the principal response agencies.

   A representative from European Refreshments will liaise with the principal response agencies at the Initial Incident Control Point.
4. Provide any necessary information and safety data to the emergency services.
5. Ensure environmental protection measures are implemented.
6. Notify the Health and Safety Authority.
7. In the event of an incident impacting the local environment:
   - Contact Mayo County Council Environmental Section, the EPA and any other relevant agencies.
   - Seek to ensure that any environmental consequences are prevented or mitigated.
   - Ensure that clean-up interventions, locations for contractors and access routes are considered carefully.
8. Gather and preserve evidence in anticipation of an investigation.

2.3 Key Actions of An Garda Síochána

1. Consider the need to declare a Major Emergency under the Framework for Major Emergency Management and activate the Garda Divisional Major Emergency Plan, if deemed necessary.

2. Mobilise resources through Ballina Garda Station and the Divisional Communications Centre in accordance with the pre-determined attendance.

3. Secure access to European Refreshments.

4. Establish communications with the other principal response agencies and European Refreshments. Meet the Controllers of Operations of the other PRA's at the Initial On-site Co-ordination Point.

5. Obtain information regarding the incident from European Refreshments and the other principal response agencies as appropriate.

6. Deploy Gardaí to the designated Rendezvous Point and Holding Area.

7. Establish and maintain Traffic Cordon Points as detailed in the Site Arrangements for Responding Emergency Services Document. Refer to Appendix 11.

8. Ensure the free passage of emergency response vehicles into and out of European Refreshments and prevent congestion at and around the site.

9. Inform the public, as necessary, on the advice of the local competent authorities, of actual or potential dangers arising from the incident and of management cordons and restrictions.

10. Advise on evacuation, where applicable.

11. Identify and request additional required resources.

12. Notify the Garda Media Liaison Officer of the incident.

13. Establish and maintain communications with the other principal response agencies at the designated Holding Area.

14. Manage a traffic parking system for emergency response vehicles at the designated Holding Area (aligned to the designated Rendezvous Point).

15. Make appropriate arrangements to convey key personnel to the site in a safe and expeditious manner.

16. Preserve the site or incident location, if deemed necessary.

17. Provide technical and forensic examination assistance.

18. Brief the Coroner for North Mayo in the event of any fatality and undertake the requisite investigation on their behalf including the preservation and collection of relevant evidence.

19. Maintain essential Garda services during the incident.

2.4 Key Actions of the Health Service Executive West / National Ambulance Service (West)

1. Consider the need to declare a Major Emergency under the Framework for Major Emergency Management and activate the HSE Major Emergency Plan, if deemed necessary.

2. Report to National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC) using the METHANE or ETHANE acronym, as appropriate.

3. Mobilise and dispatch resources in accordance with the pre-determined attendance.

4. Establish communications with the other principal response agencies and European Refreshments. Meet the Controllers of Operations of the other PRA's at the Initial On-site Co- ordination Point.

5. Obtain more information regarding the incident from European Refreshments and the other principal response agencies, as appropriate.

6. Alert nearest receiving hospital.

7. Provide relevant information to responding units as it becomes available.

8. Provide all responding staff with information pertaining to health and safety, the Danger Area and the requirement for personal protective equipment.

9. Identify a safe approach route for ambulances and direct responding units to the designated Rendezvous Point.

10. Obtain safety data on the chemicals involved in the incident.

11. Provide specialist public health and environmental health advice when required.

12. In consultation with other Controllers of Operations, agree locations for decontamination, Casualty Clearing Station, Ambulance Loading Point, Body Holding Area and Helicopter Landing Point, as appropriate.

13. Identify and request additional required resources.

14. Notify the HSE Media Liaison Officer of the incident.

15. Jointly agree the public information process with the other principal response agencies and European Refreshments in respect of types of casualties, dispatch of casualties to hospitals, etc.

16. Continually update National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC) with information on the status of the incident, numbers, etc.

2.5 Key Actions of Mayo County Council

1. Consider the need to declare a Major Emergency under the Framework for Major Emergency Management and activate the Mayo County Council Major Emergency Plan, if deemed necessary.

2. Establish communications with the other principal response agencies and European Refreshments. Meet the Controllers of Operations of the other PRA's at the Initial On-site Co-ordination Point.

3. Obtain more information regarding the incident from European Refreshments and the other principal response agencies, as appropriate.

4. Mobilise resources and equipment, as deemed necessary.

5. Notify Mayo County Councils Media Liaison Officer of the incident.

6. Seek advice and assistance where necessary from relevant sections within Mayo County Council; inter alia, the Environment Section and Water Services Section.

7. Establish liaison with relevant external agencies, where applicable.

8. Continue to operate and maintain normal infrastructure in the county.

9. Provide appropriate support, assistance and advice to European Refreshments and to those affected.

2.6 Key Actions of Mayo Fire Service

1. Mobilise resources through West Region Fire Control (Camp West) in accordance with the pre-determined attendance.

2. Consider the need to declare a Major Emergency under the Framework for Major Emergency Management and activate the Mayo County Council Major Emergency Plan, if deemed necessary.

3. The first Fire Service vehicle in attendance will proceed to the Initial Incident Control Point located at the Gatehouse inside the main entrance to European Refreshments. All other responding vehicles will report to the designated Rendezvous Point. At the RVP, resources will be directed to the site or Holding Area as required.

4. Establish communications with the other principal response agencies and European Refreshments. Meet the Controllers of Operations of the other PRA's at the Initial On-site Co- ordination Point.

5. Obtain more information regarding the incident from European Refreshments and the other principal response agencies, as appropriate.

6. The Incident Commander will conduct a dynamic risk assessment for the incident and determine what resources are initially required.

7. Establish and confirm cordons.

8. Advise on evacuation, where applicable.

9. Identify and mobilise additional required resources.

10. Identify potential contamination by fire run-off water.

11. Notify Mayo County Councils Media Liaison Officer of the incident.

12. Establish liaison with relevant external agencies, where applicable.

SECTION 3 DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES

3.1 Details of Dangerous Substances

This plan has been prepared to respond to a major accident or an uncontrolled event which could be reasonably expected to lead to a major accident involving certain dangerous substances present at European Refreshments.

3.2 Possible Major Accident Hazard Scenarios

A Major Accident Hazard Scenario is an undesirable event or sequence of events that could lead to a major accident.

The Major Accident Hazard Scenarios for the establishment were developed following hazard identification and risk assessment of activities relating to COMAH substances at the site, where likelihood and severity was considered.

14 possible Major Accident Hazard Scenarios have been identified

There are no off-site impacts / land-use planning impacts associated with any of the Major Accident Hazard Scenarios and there are no domino effects.

Refer to Appendix 2 for Map 1 showing the areas liable to be affected by each Major Accident Hazard Scenario.

3.3 Harmful Environmental Effects of the Dangerous Substances

Refer to Appendix 1 for information on the harmful environmental effects associated with each Major Accident Hazard Scenario.

3.4 Other Hazardous Substances On-site

Refer to Appendix 2 for Map 2 showing the location and providing details on other significant hazardous substances held on-site.

(Other significant hazardous substances on-site are substances not classified as dangerous by the European Union Directive, Council Directive 2012/18/EU but substances that are still considered hazardous to human health or the environment.)

3.5 Safety Data Sheets

European Refreshments will provide all necessary safety data information to the emergency services concerning any hazardous substance involved in an incident upon arrival on-site.

Safety Data Sheets for the major accident hazard substances and other significant hazardous substances on-site are available at the Security Guardhouse at European Refreshments.

SECTION 4: SITE MANAGEMENT DETAILS

4.1 Public Information Zone

The Public Information Zone (PIZ) is name given by the Central Competent Authority to the area referred to in Regulation 25(4) of the COMAH Regulations, previously called the 'specified area' in the European Communities (Control of Major Accident Hazards Involving Dangerous Substances) Regulations, SI 74 of 2006.

The Public Information Zone is essentially the area within which persons are liable to be affected by a major accident occurring at the establishment and constitutes the outer planning zone (the 1 x 10-7 contour).

For this establishment, the area within which persons are liable to be affected by a major accident occurring at the establishment is contained entirely within the site boundary.

4.2 Site Occupancy

The site is permanently manned. Full site occupancy is approximately 400 persons.

On activation of the External Emergency Plan, European Refreshments will initiate their off-site evacuation procedures.

4.3 Details of Site Access and Egress

Access and egress to European Refreshments is through the main gate on the R314, Killala Road, Ballina.

Refer to Appendix 3 for Map 1 showing the access / egress route.

Refer to Appendix 3 for Map 2 showing the European Refreshments site boundary.

4.4 Incident Control Point

The Initial Incident Control Point is the location on-site from which the principal response agencies and European Refreshments personnel will control, direct and co-ordinate their organisations initial response to the emergency prior to the establishment of the on-site co-ordination group.

The first response vehicle from each PRA will convene at the Initial Incident Control Point. All other responding vehicles will report to the designated Rendezvous Point.

The Initial Incident Control Point is located at the Gatehouse inside the main entrance gate to European Refreshments. The Initial Control Point may be repositioned depending on the location and type of incident.

Refer to Appendix 3 for Map 1 showing the location of the Initial Incident Control Point.

4.5 On-site Co-ordination Point

The On-site Co-ordination Point is the location from which the principal response agencies and European Refreshments personnel will control, direct and co-ordinate their organisations response to the emergency.

The Initial On-site Co-ordination Point is located at the Gatehouse inside the main entrance gate to European Refreshments. The On-site Co-ordination Point may be repositioned depending on the location, type and duration of the incident.

Refer to Appendix 9 for Map 1 showing the location of the Initial On-site Co-ordination Point.

4.6 Rendezvous Points

The Rendezvous Point is the location to which all responding vehicles will report to until directed otherwise (apart from the first response vehicle from each principal response agency which will respond to the Initial Incident Control Point). Two Rendezvous Points have been identified for European Refreshments. For any incident, only one point will be used.

The Rendezvous Point will be under the control of An Garda Síochána. Other agencies may have a Marshalling Officer present to direct responding vehicles to the scene or to a Holding Area.

Rendezvous Point 1
Rendezvous Point 1 (RVP1) is located at the main entrance gate to the establishment on the R314, Killala Road, Ballina. Refer to Appendix 3 for Map 1 showing the location of RVP1.

Rendezvous Point 2
Rendezvous Point 2 (RVP2) is located at the Ballina Athletics Track (adjacent to the Archway at Old Belleek Road). Refer to Appendix 3 for Map 1 showing the location of RVP2.

4.7 Holding Areas

The Holding Area is the location that resources which are not immediately required at site will wait until requested.

The Holding Area will be under the control of An Garda Síochána. Other agencies may have a Marshalling Officer present to direct responding vehicles into action.

The location of the Holding Area is determined by the choice of the designated Rendezvous Point.

Holding Area 1
Holding Area 1 corresponds to RVP 1 and is located at the main entrance gate to the establishment on the R314, Killala Road, Ballina. There is sufficient parking in the bellmouth to the entrance gate for vehicles.

Refer to Appendix 3 for Map 1 showing the locations of Holding Area 1.

Holding Area 2
Holding Area 2 corresponds to RVP 2 and is located at Ballina Athletics Track (adjacent to the Archway at Old Belleek Road).

Refer to Appendix 3 for Map 1 showing the location of Holding Area 2.

4.8 Site Management

Effective site management involves establishing cordons. In principal, an inner cordon is where rescue activities are undertaken and the substance of the emergency is dealt with. The outer cordon is a safer area that surrounds the inner cordon. Cordons may be repositioned depending on the location, type and duration of an incident.

Refer to Appendix 4 for a diagram of idealised site management.

4.9 Danger Area

A Danger Area may be defined as part of site management arrangements where there is a definite risk to rescue personnel, over and above that which would normally pertain at emergency operations. The Danger Area will reflect the type of incident and will be determined by the Controller of Operations of the lead agency (advised by the Rostered Senior Fire Officer / Fire Service Incident Commander).

If a Danger Area is declared, an access point will be established to act as a safety checkpoint to monitor personnel within the area.

4.10 Casualty Clearing Station

The Casualty Clearing Station (CCS) and Ambulance Loading Area is located adjacent to the Security Guardhouse. This area may be moved, depending on the location and type of indecent.

4.11 Site Arrangements for Responding Emergency Services

The Site Arrangements for Responding Emergency Services Document assists the emergency services respond to an incident at European Refreshments when this plan has been activated. The document outlines the particular site management arrangements, proposed traffic cordons and route plans in the event of a response by emergency services.

Refer to Appendix 5 for the Site Arrangements for Responding Emergency Services Document.

4.12 Helicopter Landing Site

Ballina Stephenites GAA Pitch, Ballina East and Ardnaree Sarsfields GAA Pitch are Pre-Designated Landing Zones (PDLZ's) for landing Emergency Medical Service (EMS) helicopters.

Ballina Stephenites GAA Pitch is the closest PDLZ to European Refreshments.

A landing site will be considered based on suitability and availability, following consultation between the National Aeromedical Co-ordination Centre, the helicopter crew and the ground ambulance.

Refer to Appendix 6 for maps showing the location of the Pre-Designated Landing Zones for Emergency Medical Service helicopters in the Ballina area.

4.13 On-site Co-ordination Centre

If a Major Emergency is declared under the Framework for Major Emergency Management, the On-site Co-ordination Group will convene at suitable accommodation such as Ballina Civic Offices or Ballina Garda Station.

The Controller of Operations from An Garda Síochána, the Health Service Executive and Mayo County Council, their support staff and representatives from European Refreshments will attend. The On-site Co-ordination Group will be chaired by the lead agency.

Specialists and expert advisers may be consulted by the Co-ordination Group.

SECTION 5: SITE ENVIRONMENT

5.1 Details of Land Use

Land use surrounding the establishment is primarily agricultural, forestry (recreational forest park), residential and river.

Approximately 118 houses and Belleek Castle lie within 700m of the centre point of the facility.

5.2 Details of Environmentally Sensitive Areas

The river Moy is the primary environmentally sensitive area in the vicinity of the establishment. The river is part of the Killala Bay / Moy Estuary Special Area of Conservation and Special Protection Area. It is designated as follows:

- Special Area of Conservation (reference SAC 002298)
- Proposed Natural Heritage Area (reference SAC 000458)
- Special Protection Area (reference SPA 004036)

The distance from the centre point of the facility to the Special Area of Conservation and proposed Natural Heritage Area is approximately 641 meters and the distance from the centre point of the facility to the Special Protection Area is approximately 907 meters.

Refer to Appendix 7 for Map 1 showing the location of environmentally sensitive areas in the vicinity of European Refreshments.

5.3 Predicted Environmental Effects of an Accident

Refer to Appendix 1 for information on the potential environmental consequences associated with each Major Accident Hazard Scenario.

5.4 Substances with Dangerous to the Environment Classifications

The substances with dangerous to the environment classifications, which are stored on site, are ammonia, diesel and trade secret ingredient mixtures.

It is considered that a loss of containment event for each of these substances does not pose a risk to the environment for the following reasons:

Ammonia
Ammonia is stored as a liquid at -34ºC. In the event of a loss of containment, the substance will immediately evaporate due to the large temperature gradient between the storage temperature and ambient temperature. Therefore, it is considered that ammonia liquid entering the environment is not a credible scenario.

Diesel
Diesel is stored in a tank within a bund. The volume of diesel in the tank is restricted so in the event of tank failure, no bund overtop will occur. Therefore, it is considered that diesel entering the environment is not a credible scenario.

Trade Secret Ingredient Mixtures
Trade secret ingredient mixtures (liquids) are stored and handled across the site in a variety of container sizes, varying from 20 litre - 1000 litre containers. Containers are delivered directly into the plant via loading bays. Any material spilled or leaked from handling will enter the process drains and will be retained in the wastewater treatment system. Trade secret ingredient mixtures are also stored in bulk tanks. These tanks are contained within a bund. Any material spilled will be contained on site. Therefore, it is considered that a trade secret ingredient entering the environment is not a credible scenario.

5.5 On-site Containment Measures

The following equipment, measures and processes are in place at European Refreshments to help manage and protect the environment.

Spill Equipment
Spill equipment held on-site includes spill kits, large spill booms, containers for waste and mobile lighting units.

Bunding
All external storage tanks are contained in bunded areas. The bunds provide the necessary capacity in the event of full containment loss.

Surface Water Testing
Surface water from the site (this includes the internal process drainage system and the external storm water drainage system) passes through one of 2 penstocks before it is discharged to a pond at Belleek that is hydraulically connected with the River Moy. The surface water is continuously monitored for containments before it is discharged off-site. If upper limit levels of containments are detected (Chemical Oxygen Demand and pH test), the penstocks will automatically divert the water to the fire water retention pond (FWRP).

Fire Water Retention Pond
If a spill occurs on-site and is detected, the penstocks can be remotely activated in the Security Control Room or Effluent Pre-Treatment Plant to divert the flow of water to the fire water retention pond. The penstocks can also be manually activated.

The FWRP has a capacity of 5000m^3 and has been adequately sized to retain sprinkler and fire-fighting water from the site.

Petrol Interceptors
The on-site drainage network consists of a series of petrol interceptors in the diesel tanker unloading area, HGV parking area, service / marshalling yard and car parking area. The interceptors capture any hydrocarbon pollutant entering the on-site drainage system.

Wastewater treatment plant
Any contaminated water contained in the fire water retention pond can be pumped to the wastewater treatment plant for treatment.

5.6 Active Fire Protection Systems

Indoor areas are equipped with water, foam and dry sprinkler systems, as appropriate. Water hoses and fire extinguishers are also sited throughout the plant.

The external tank farm and tanker unloading area are covered by a detection system. Activation of this detection system automatically activates a foam deluge system. The deluge systems can also be manually activated.

5.7 Fire Hydrants and Static Water Storage

Water supply for fire-fighting purposes is delivered through 14 overground hydrants (12 bar and 6 bar instantaneous couplings) located across the site. Water supply for these hydrants is pumped (via two diesel pumps with capacity to deliver 9,500 l/min at 125 psi) from 2no. 760m^3 (760,000 l) water storage tanks.

There are also 3no. hydrants fed from the local authority mains water supply on-site. 2no. reserve static water storage tanks are also located on the northern boundary of the site. These tanks both have a capacity of 2,200m^3 (2,200,000 l).

Depending on the type of incident, water from the fire water retention pond may also be used to supplement demand.

Refer to Appendix 2 for Map 3 showing the hydrant system and static water storage tanks.

SECTION 6: WORKING WITH THE MEDIA

6.1 Inter-Agency Public Communications Plan

The media plan shall conform, in general, with the Western Region Emergency Services "Inter-Agency Public Communication Plan" of September 2012.

The activities of the Media Liaison Officers (MLO's) from each principal response agency and the External Affairs Co-ordinator from European Refreshments (or Incident Management Team Representative) should be co-ordinated by the MLO of the lead agency.

Upon activation of this plan, the MLO's from the principal response agencies and the External Affairs Co-ordinator from European Refreshments may communicate initially by teleconference.

Prior to release to the media, all statements should be approved by the Controller of Operations of the lead agency.

An initial media holding statement should be issued by An Garda Síochána as soon as practicable.

Refer to Appendix 8 for a sample initial media holding statement.

6.2 Media Liaison Officer Meeting Centre

If the MLO from each agency and the External Affairs Co-ordinator from European Refreshments attend the incident, they shall meet at the On-site Co-ordination Point. The Initial On-site Co-ordination Point is located at the Gatehouse inside the main entrance gate to European Refreshments.

Refer to Appendix 3 for Map 1 showing the location of the On-site Co-ordination Point.

6.3 Co-ordination with European Refreshments Media Strategy

The MLO of the lead agency should maintain liaison with the External Affairs Co-ordinator from European Refreshments to ensure that there is a co-ordinated response to the media, insofar as is appropriate, in the interest of public safety.

6.4 Media Centre

If a media centre is necessary, the media will be directed to a centre established at a suitable location.

SECTION 7: RECOVERY

7.1 European Refreshments Post Incident Procedures

European Refreshments are committed to providing all reasonable support including human resources and materials for the protection, management and clean-up of the environment required as a result of a major accident on-site.

In the event of a major accident, it is likely that the services of contractors and external specialists will be required to assist with the recovery and reinstatement effort.

7.2 Contractors and External Specialists

Waste management contractors are retained by European Refreshments to manage, handle and dispose of all waste on-site. These contractors also provide a 24hr response service with expertise in hazardous waste management and supply of specialist equipment necessary to supplement the site's response arrangements.

Prior to handling or removing any contaminated absorbents or earth, detail of the hazardous properties of any contaminants shall be provided to the relevant contractor.

7.3 Organisations to be Contacted

In the event of an accident related to a Major Accident Hazard Scenario, the Safety and Loss Prevention Manager, or their delegate, from European Refreshments shall, without delay, inform the Health and Safety Authority.

Where required, other relevant external agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency, HSE Public Health Department, National Parks and Wildlife Service and Inland Fisheries Ireland shall be contacted.

7.4 Post Incident Action by An Garda Síochána

Following an incident, An Garda Síochána shall provide all necessary and appropriate information on the investigations as soon as practicable.

7.5 Post Incident Action by the Health Service Executive

Following an incident, the HSE shall, as applicable in the circumstances, assess the health needs of those affected and consider the scale of immediate and ongoing needs for assistance.

7.6 Post Incident Action by Mayo County Council

Following an incident, Mayo County Council shall, as applicable in the circumstances, provide appropriate support, assistance and advice to European Refreshments and to those affected.

Mayo County Council may assist in relevant remedial and restorative works.

7.7 Management of Recovery if a Major Emergency is Declared

Where a Major Emergency under the Framework for Major Emergency Management has been declared, the management of recovery shall conform, in general, with Section 6 of the Framework Document and the Major Emergency Plans of:

- An Garda Síochána, Mayo Division
- Health Service Executive West
- Mayo County Council

7.8 Post Incident Review

In the event that this plan is activated, each principal response agency and European Refreshments should carry out an operational debriefing of its involvement in the response and document this debriefing in a report.

A composite report, based on appropriate input from the PRA's and European Refreshments internal reports should be compiled by the initial lead agency for submission, within a reasonable timescale, to the relevant Regional Steering Group.

The report should include, inter alia, lessons learned from the incident and inter-agency co-ordination aspects of the response.

APPENDIX 1: MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARD SCENARIOS

Scenario 1a & 1b:	Toxic Vapour Release and On-site Exposure (Ammonia)
Scenario 2:	Toxic Vapour Release and Off-site Exposure (Ammonia)
Scenario 3:	Environmental Release or Spill
Scenario 4:	Flammable Liquid Fire at Bulk Flammable Storage
Scenario 5:	Catastrophic Tank Failure at Bulk Flammable Storage
Scenario 6 & 7:	Fire in Production Area A
Scenario 8 & 9:	Fire in Production Area C
Scenario 10:	Fire in Production Area B
Scenario 11:	Fire in Production Area D
Scenario 12:	Intermediate Bulk Container (IBC) Fire in ASRS
Scenario 13:	Fire in Entire ASRS
Scenario 14:	Fire in Waste Management area

Scenario 1: Toxic Vapour Release and On-site Exposure (Ammonia)

Nature of Hazard	(1a) Release of Ammonia at Chilled Water Plant (941kg) and on-site exposure or (1b) Release of Ammonia at Ammonia Plant Room (330kg) and on-site exposure
Substance	UN 1005
Inventory	4 tonnes
Hazard Information	- Flammable in confined spaces - Causes burns and is toxic by inhalation
Location	- North east of site (Chiller Building) - South of site, adjacent to ASRS
Potential On-site Human Health Effects	- Significant risk of fatality within Plant Rooms due to toxic dose
Major Accident Hazard Impacts Off-site	- None
Potential On-site Environmental Effects	- None
Control Measures and Environmental Protection	- Activate Internal Emergency Plan - Evacuate site - Call Emergency Services and activate External Emergency Plan - Penstocks divert to fire water retention pond (FWRP) - Ensure Plant Room doors are closed once all personnel have left - Cordon-off area - Shut down power to Ammonia Plant - Setup water curtains downwind of incident
Mitigating Resources	- Emergency Response Team - Fixed gas detection and portable gas meter - Fire hydrants - Water curtains - Fire water retention pond - Full fire kit - Breathing apparatus and gas tight suits - 15min Escape SCBA

Scenario 2: Toxic Vapour Release and Off-site Exposure (Ammonia)

Nature of Hazard	Release of Ammonia at Chilled Water Plant (941kg) or Release of Ammonia at Ammonia Plant Room (330kg) and off-site exposure
Substance	UN 1005
Inventory	4 tonnes
Hazard Information	- Flammable in confined spaces - Causes burns and is toxic by inhalation
Location	- North east of site (Chiller Building) - South of site, adjacent to ASRS
Potential On-site Human Health Effects	- Significant risk of fatality within Plant Rooms due to toxic dose
Major Accident Hazard Impacts Off-site	- None
Potential On-site Environmental Effects	- None
Control Measures and Environmental Protection	- Activate Internal Emergency Plan - Evacuate site - Call Emergency Services and activate External Emergency Plan - Penstocks divert to Fire Water Retention Pond (FWRP) - Ensure Plant Room doors are closed once all personnel have left - Cordon-off area - Shut down power to Ammonia Plant - Setup water curtains downwind of incident
Mitigating Resources	- Emergency Response Team - Fixed gas detection and portable gas meter - Fire hydrants - Water curtains - Fire water retention pond - Full fire kit - Breathing apparatus and gas tight suits - 15min Escape SCBA

Scenario 3: Environmental Release or Spill

Nature of Hazard	Potential release of Dangerous to the Environment substances, including firewater
Substance	UN 1202 UN 2319
Inventory	445 tonnes
Hazard Information	- Dangerous to the environment, in particular aquatic life
Location	- Bulk Flammable Storage Area to north of site - ASRS to south of site - Diesel storage tank to north east of site - Waste Management Area to east of site
Potential On-site Human Health Effects	- None
Major Accident Hazard Impacts Off-site	- None
Potential On-site Environmental Effects	- None
Control Measures and Environmental Protection	- Activate Internal Emergency Plan - Call Emergency Services and activate External Emergency Plan - Penstocks divert to Fire Water Retention Pond - Cordon off area - Obtain spill kits, booms and drain blocking devices
Mitigating Resources	- Emergency Response Team - Firewater retention pond and EPTP - Spill kits, booms and drain blocking devices

Scenario 4: Flammable Liquid Fire at Bulk Flammable Storage

Nature of Hazard	Hose failure during unloading flammable liquids with subsequent fire involving tanker (15,780kg) and largest tank (49,707kg)
Substance	UN 1170
Inventory	300 tonnes
Hazard Information	- Jet fire - Pool fire - Flash fire - Vapour cloud explosion
Location	- Bulk flammable storage / unloading area
Potential On-site Human Health Effects	- Thermal radiation (4.5 kW/m^2), up to 52m radius - Overpressure effects (0.021bar) up to 38m radius
Major Accident Hazard Impacts Off-site	- None
Potential On-site Environmental Effects	- None - Firewater run-off and AFFF foam contained on site in fire water retention pond
Control Measures and Environmental Protection	- Activate Internal Emergency Plan - Evacuate site - Activate deluge system if safe to do so, if not activated already - Call Emergency Services and activate External Emergency Plan - Cordon-off area - Penstocks divert to fire water retention pond
Mitigating Resources	- Emergency Response Team - - Foam Sprinkler Deluge System - - Fire Hydrants - - Fire Water Retention Pond - Full fire kit - Breathing apparatus

Scenario 5: Catastrophic Tank Failure at Bulk Flammable Storage

Nature of Hazard	Hose failure during unloading flammable liquids with subsequent fire involving tanker (15,780kg) and largest tank (49,707kg)
Substance	UN 1170
Inventory	300 tonnes
Hazard Information	- Jet fire - Pool fire - Flash fire - Vapour cloud explosion
Location	- Bulk flammable storage / unloading area
Potential On-site Human Health Effects	- Thermal radiation (4.5 kW/m^2), up to 115m radius - Overpressure effects (0.021bar) up to 92m radius
Major Accident Hazard Impacts Off-site	- None
Potential On-site Environmental Effects	- None - Firewater run-off and AFFF foam contained on site in fire water retention pond
Control Measures and Environmental Protection	- Activate Internal Emergency Plan - Evacuate site - Activate deluge system if safe to do so, if not activated already - Call Emergency Services and activate External Emergency Plan - Cordon-off area - Penstocks divert to fire water retention pond
Mitigating Resources	- Emergency Response Team - Foam Sprinkler Deluge System - Fire Hydrants - Fire water retention pond - Full fire kit - Breathing apparatus

Scenario 6 & 7: Fire in Production Area A

Nature of Hazard	Leak of aqueous solvent mixture / hydrocarbon (55,000kg) or catastrophic rupture of tank and ignition (20,000kg)
Substance	UN 1197
Inventory	945 tonnes
Hazard Information	- Jet fire - Pool fire - Flash fire - Vapour cloud explosion
Location	- Production Area A tanks
Potential On-site Human Health Effects	- Thermal Radiation (4.5kW/m2) up to 44m radius - Overpressure effects (0.021bar) up to 17m radius
Major Accident Hazard Impacts Off-site	- None
Potential On-site Environmental Effects	- None - Firewater run-off and AFFF foam contained on site in fire water retention pond
Control Measures and Environmental Protection	- Activate Internal Emergency Plan - Evacuate site - Call Emergency Services and activate External Emergency Plan - Cordon-off area - Penstocks divert to fire water retention pond
Mitigating Resources	- Emergency Response Team - Foam Sprinkler System (AFFF) - Fire Hydrants - Fire water retention pond and effluent plant - Full fire kit - Breathing apparatus

Scenario 8 & 9: Fire in Production Area C

Nature of Hazard	Leak of hydrocarbon (16,150kg) or catastrophic rupture of tank and ignition (8,075kg)
Substance	UN 2319
Inventory	360 tonnes
Hazard Information	- Jet fire - Pool fire - Flash fire
Location	- Production Area C tanks
Potential On-site Human Health Effects	- Thermal Radiation (4.5kW/m2) up to 69m radius - Overpressure effects (0.021bar) up to 17m radius
Major Accident Hazard Impacts Off-site	- None
Potential On-site Environmental Effects	- None - Firewater run-off and AFFF foam contained on site in fire water retention pond
Control Measures and Environmental Protection	- Activate Internal Emergency Plan - Evacuate site - Call Emergency Services and activate External Emergency Plan - Cordon-off area - Penstocks divert to fire water retention pond
Mitigating Resources	- Emergency Response Team - Foam Sprinkler System (AFFF) - Fire Hydrants - Fire water retention pond and effluent plant - Full fire kit - Breathing apparatus

Scenario 10: Fire in Production Area B

Nature of Hazard	Leak of solvent mix and hydrocarbon solvent mix (15,000kg) and ignition
Substance	UN 1197
Inventory	945 tonnes
Hazard Information	- Jet fire - Pool fire - Flash fire - Vapour cloud explosion
Location	- Production Area B tanks
Potential On-site Human Health Effects	- Thermal Radiation (4.5kW/m2) up to 72m radius - Overpressure effects (0.168bar) up to 84m radius
Major Accident Hazard Impacts Off-site	- None
Potential On-site Environmental Effects	- None - Firewater run-off and AFFF foam contained on site in fire water retention pond
Control Measures and Environmental Protection	- Activate Internal Emergency Plan - Evacuate site - Call Emergency Services and activate External Emergency Plan - Cordon-off area - Penstocks divert to fire water retention pond
Mitigating Resources	- Emergency Response Team - Foam Sprinkler System (AFFF) - Fire Hydrants - Fire water retention pond and effluent plant - Full fire kit - Breathing apparatus

Scenario 11: Fire in Production Area D

Nature of Hazard	Leak of hydrocarbon solvent mix (1,600kg) and ignition
Substance	UN 1197
Inventory	945 tonnes
Hazard Information	- Jet fire - Pool fire - Flash fire - Vapour cloud explosion
Location	- Production Area D tanks
Potential On-site Human Health Effects	- Thermal Radiation (4.5kW/m2) up to 36m radius - Overpressure effects (0.168bar) up to 42m radius
Major Accident Hazard Impacts Off-site	- None
Potential On-site Environmental Effects	- None - Firewater run-off and AFFF foam contained on site in EPTP and fire water retention pond
Control Measures and Environmental Protection	- Activate Internal Emergency Plan - Evacuate site - Call Emergency Services and activate External Emergency Plan - Cordon-off area - Penstocks divert to fire water retention pond
Mitigating Resources	- Emergency Response Team - Foam Sprinkler System (AFFF) - Fire Hydrants - Fire water retention pond and effluent plant - Full fire kit - Breathing apparatus

Scenario 12: Intermediate Bulk Container (IBC) Fire in ASRS

Nature of Hazard	Spill of flammable solvent from an IBC (1,000 litres), due to falling from height and subsequent fire
Substance	UN 1170
Inventory	300 tonnes
Hazard Information	- Thermal effects if exposed to fire - Overpressure injuries
Location	- ASRS building
Potential On-site Human Health Effects	- Thermal Radiation (4.5kW/m2) up to 37m radius - Overpressure effects (0.021bar) up to 19m radius
Major Accident Hazard Impacts Off-site	- None
Potential On-site Environmental Effects	- None - Firewater run-off and AFFF foam contained on site in EPTP and fire water retention pond
Control Measures and Environmental Protection	- Activate Internal Emergency Plan - Evacuate site - Call Emergency Services and activate External Emergency Plan - Cordon-off area - Penstocks divert to fire water retention pond
Mitigating Resources	- Emergency Response Team - Foam Sprinkler System (AFFF) - Fire Hydrants - Fire water retention pond and effluent plant - Full fire kit - Breathing apparatus

Scenario 13: Fire in Entire ASRS

Nature of Hazard	Pool Fire due to leak and ignition (2,090,000kg aqueous mixtures) in entire ASRS building caused by previous event
Substance	UN 1170
	UN 1197
	UN 2319
	UN 3082
Inventory	2615 tonnes
Hazard Information	- Thermal effects if exposed to pool fire
Location	- ASRS building
Potential On-site Human Health Effects	- Thermal Radiation (4.5kW/m2) up to 62m radius
Major Accident Hazard Impacts Off-site	- None
Potential On-site Environmental Effects	- None - Firewater run-off and AFFF foam contained on site in EPTP and fire water retention pond
Control Measures and Environmental Protection	- Activate Internal Emergency Plan - Evacuate site - Call Emergency Services and activate External Emergency Plan - Cordon-off area - Penstocks divert to fire water retention pond
Mitigating Resources	- Emergency Response Team - Foam Sprinkler System (AFFF) - Fire Hydrants - Fire water retention pond and effluent plant - Full fire kit - Breathing apparatus

Scenario 14: Fire in Waste Management area

Nature of Hazard	Leak of flammable liquid from Intermediate Bulk Container (IBC),leading to fire and potential escalation to whole area (25,000kg solvent)
Substance	UN 1170
	UN 1197
	UN 2319
	UN 3082
Inventory	2615 tonnes
Hazard Information	- Pool fire - Flash fire - Vapour cloud explosion - Thermal effects if exposed to fire - Overpressure injuries
Location	- Waste management area
Potential On-site Human Health Effects	- Thermal Radiation (4.5kW/m2) up to 62m radius - Overpressure effects (0.021bar) up to 17m radius
Major Accident Hazard Impacts Off-site	- None
Potential On-site Environmental Effects	- None - Firewater run-off and AFFF foam contained on site in fire water retention pond
Control Measures and Environmental Protection	- Activate Internal Emergency Plan - Evacuate site - Call Emergency Services and activate External Emergency Plan - Cordon-off area - Penstocks divert to fire water retention pond
Mitigating Resources	- Emergency Response Team - Foam Sprinkler System (AFFF) - Fire Hydrants - Fire water retention pond and effluent plant - Full fire kit - Breathing apparatus

APPENDIX 2: SITE FACILITY MAPS

Map 1: Major Accident Hazards On-site Risks Drawing

Map 2: Site Information Drawing

Map 1: Major Accident Hazards On-site Risks Drawing



Map 2: Site Information Drawing



APPENDIX 3: LOCATIONS MAPS

Map 1: Map Identifying Ballina Beverages & Other Key Locations

Map 2: Ballina Beverages Site Boundary Map

Map 1: Map Identifying Ballina Beverages & Other Key Locations



Map 2: Ballina Beverages Site Boundary Map



Diagram 1: Idealised Site Management Diagram

Diagram 1: Idealised Site Management Diagram



Site Arrangements for Responding Emergency Services Document

Site Arrangements for Responding Emergency Services

KILLALA ROAD

BALLINA

CO. MAYO

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Date	November 2018		

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

This document has been developed to assist the emergency services from the Principal Response Agencies (PRA's) respond to an incident at Atlantic Industries *(also known as Ballina Beverages)* in the event that the External Emergency Plan for the establishment is activated.

This document outlines the particular site management arrangements and Traffic Cordons to be put in place.

Refer to Appendix 1 for an overview of the location of the establishment.

SECTION 1: INCIDENT CONTROL POINT

1.1 Incident Control Point

The Incident Control Point is the location on-site from which the PRA's and Atlantic Industries personnel will control, direct and co-ordinate their organisations initial response to the emergency.

The first response vehicle from each PRA will convene at the Initial Incident Control Point. All other responding vehicles will report to the designated Rendezvous Point (RVP).

1.1.1 Location of Initial Incident Control Point

The Initial Incident Control Point is located at the Gatehouse inside the main entrance gate to Atlantic Industries.

The Initial Incident Control Point may be repositioned depending on the location and type of incident.

Refer to Appendix 1 for an overview of the location of the Initial Incident Control Point.

Initial Incident Control Point - Gatehouse

SECTION 2: RENDEZVOUS POINTS & HOLDING AREAS

2.1 Rendezvous Points

The Rendezvous Point is the location to which all resources responding to the emergency site are directed in the first instance. An Garda Síochána will organise the Rendezvous Point. Other services may have a Marshalling Officer present to direct responding vehicles to the scene or to the Holding Area.

Two Rendezvous Points have been identified for Atlantic Industries. For any incident, only one Rendezvous Point will be used. The Rendezvous Point is selected based on the incident details and other factors including wind direction.

Refer to Appendix 1 for an overview of the location of the Rendezvous Points.

2.1.1 Location of Rendezvous Point 1

Rendezvous Point 1 (RVP1) is located at the main entrance gate to Atlantic Industries on the R314, Killala Road, Ballina.

RVP1 – Entrance Gate to Atlantic Industries

2.1.2 Location of Rendezvous Point 2

Rendezvous Point 2 (RVP2) is located at the Ballina Athletics Track (adjacent to the Archway at Old Belleek Road, Ballina).



RVP2 - Ballina Athletics Track

2.1.3 Access Routes to Rendezvous Points

Refer to Appendix 2 for maps and photographs detailing directions from Foxford / Castlebar, Sligo and Crossmolina / Belmullet to each Rendezvous Point.

2.2 Holding Areas

The Holding Area is the location that resources which are not immediately required at the site will wait until requested. An Garda Síochána will organise the Holding Area. Other services may have a Marshalling Officer present to direct responding vehicles into action.

The location of the Holding Area is determined by the choice of the designated Rendezvous Point.

Refer to Appendix 1 for an overview of the location of the Holding Areas.

2.2.1 Location of Holding Area 1

Holding Area 1 corresponds to RVP 1 and is located at the main entrance gate to Atlantic Industries on the R314, Killala Road, Ballina.

Holding Area 1 – Entrance Gate to Atlantic Industries

2.2.2 Location of Holding Area 2

Holding Area 2 corresponds to RVP 2 and is located at Ballina Athletics Track (adjacent to the Archway at Old Belleek Road, Ballina).



Holding Area 2 – Ballina Athletics Track

SECTION 3: ON-SITE CO-ORDINATION POINT

3.1 On-Site Co-ordination Point

The On-site Co-ordination Point is the location from which the PRA's and Atlantic Industries personnel will control, direct and co-ordinate their organisations response to the emergency.

3.1.1 Location of Initial On-Site Co-ordination Point

The Initial On-site Co-ordination Point is located at the Gatehouse inside the main entrance gate to Atlantic Industries. The Initial On-site Co-ordination Point may be repositioned depending on the location, type and duration of the incident.

Refer to Appendix 1 for an overview of the location of the Initial On-site Co-ordination Point.



Initial On-Site Co-ordination Point - Gatehouse

SECTION 4: CORDONS

4.1 Inner Cordon

The Inner Cordon defines an area where the emergency services work to rescue casualties and survivors and deal with the substance of the emergency.

For Atlantic Industries, the Initial Inner Cordon is defined by the perimeter fence surrounding the facility. The Initial Inner Cordon may be repositioned depending on the location and type of incident.

The Inner Cordon should be under the control of the Lead Agency.

Refer to Appendix 3 for a map identifying the Initial Inner Cordon for Atlantic Industries.

4.1.1 Initial Inner Cordon Access Point

The Inner Cordon Access Point is located at the main entrance gate to the facility.

4.2 Outer Cordon

The Outer Cordon seals off an extensive area around the incident scene. The area between the Inner Cordon and Outer Cordon is used by the PRA's to provide support to personnel within the Inner Cordon. The Outer Cordon may be repositioned depending on the location and type of incident.

The Outer Cordon is managed by An Garda Síochána.

Refer to Appendix 3 for a map identifying the Initial Outer Cordon for Atlantic Industries.

4.2.1 Initial Outer Cordon Access Points

The Initial Outer Cordon Access Points are detailed in the table below.

Refer to Appendix 4 for a map identifying the Initial Outer Cordon Access Points (Traffic Cordon Points).

Cordon Point	Location	Function
CP 4	Killala Road Roundabout	Traffic Control & Diversions
CP 8	Castle Road Junction	Traffic Control & Diversions
CP 13	Killala Road / Farnoo Junction	Traffic Control & Diversions
CP 14	Belleek Arch	Traffic Control & Diversions

4.3 Traffic Cordon

The purpose of the Traffic Cordon is to ensure free passage of emergency response vehicles into and out of the site and to prevent congestion in the area.

The Traffic Cordons may be repositioned depending on the location, type and duration of the incident.

Traffic Cordons are managed by An Garda Síochána.

4.3.1 Initial Traffic Cordons

The Initial Traffic Cordon Points are detailed in the table below.

Priority should be assigned to the establishment of the Initial Outer Cordon at CP 4, CP 8, CP 13 and CP 14.

Refer to Appendix 4 for a map identifying the Initial Traffic Cordon Points.

Cordon Point	Location	Function
CP 1	Cooneal Junction (Half Way House)	Divert Traffic to Gurteens / Crossmolina Road
CP 2	The Font, Ballina	Traffic Control & Diversions
CP 3	Fahy's Corner	Traffic Control & Diversions
CP 4	Killala Road Roundabout	Traffic Control & Diversions
CP 5	Sli Ectra Road off Killala Road	Divert Traffic to Crossmolina Road
CP 6	Humber Street Roundabout	Traffic Control – Priority to Emergency Service Vehicles
CP 7	Arran Place	Traffic Control – Priority to Emergency Service Vehicles
CP 8	Castle Road Junction	Traffic Control & Diversions
CP 9	Lower Bridge, Ballina	Direct Emergency Service Traffic Contra Flow One Way System to Dillon Terrace
CP 10	Clare Street / Cathedral Road	Direct incoming traffic onto Cathedral Road
CP 11	Riverslade Road Junction	Traffic Control – Priority to Emergency Service Vehicles
CP 12	Sligo Road Roundabout	Traffic Control – Priority to Emergency Service Vehicles
CP 13	Killala Road / Farnoo Junction	Traffic Control & Diversions
CP 14	Belleek Arch	Traffic Control & Diversions

SECTION 5: ROUTE PLANNING

5.1 General

The emergency services responding to an incident at Atlantic Industries will travel from various locations, as deemed necessary by each of the individual PRA's. Accordingly, the access route to the designated Rendezvous Point will vary based on the direction of approach. The route to each Rendezvous Point is predetermined to facilitate a more efficient and co-ordinated response.

Refer to Appendix 2 for maps and photographs detailing directions from Foxford / Castlebar, Crossmolina / Belmullet and Sligo to each Rendezvous Point.

APPENDIX 1: LOCATION MAP

Map 1: Map Identifying Atlantic Industries & Other Key Locations

Map 1: Map Identifying Atlantic Industries & Other Key Locations



APPENDIX 2: ROUTE PLANNING

Route from Foxford / Castlebar to RVP 1

Route from Foxford / Castlebar to RVP 2

Route from Crossmolina / Belmullet to RVP 1

Route from Crossmolina / Belmullet to RVP 2

Route from Sligo to RVP 1

Route from Sligo to RVP 2

Route from Foxford / Castlebar to RVP 1



The Font

From Foxford Road N26 onto N59 Teeling St. Travel straight through junction of Lord Edward St. and Kevin Barry St. to Fahy's Corner.

Fahy's Corner

Travel along Teeling St. for 300m to traffic lights and straight through onto Pound St. for 300m to Killala Road Roundabout.

Killala Road Roundabout

Travel straight through roundabout onto R314 and travel 2km to Initial Incident Control Point, Initial On-Site Co-ordination Point, RVP 1 and Holding Area 1.

Killala Road

Approach Holding Area 1 on left, 100m before entrance to Atlantic Industries.

Holding Area 1

Killala Road Business Park.

RVP 1

At entrance gate to Atlantic Industries.

Initial Incident Control Point & Initial On-site Co-ordination Point

At Gatehouse inside entrance gate to Atlantic Industries.

Route from Foxford / Castlebar to RVP 2



The Font

From Foxford Road N26 onto N59 Teeling St. Travel straight through junction of Lord Edward St. and Kevin Barry St. to Fahy's Corner.

Fahy's Corner

Travel along Teeling St. for 300m to traffic lights and straight through onto Pound St. for 300m to Killala Road Roundabout.

Killala Road Roundabout

2nd exit at roundabout onto Circular Road and proceed 250m to next roundabout.

Humbert Street Roundabout

2nd exit at roundabout onto Humbert St. for 150m to next roundabout. Dunnes Stores is situated on left hand side.

Arran Place Roundabout

Turn left at roundabout onto Aran Place and travel 100m. Ballina Civic Offices are situated on left hand side.

Castle Road

Turn left onto Castle Road and travel approximately 300m to entrance archway into Belleek.



Old Belleek Road

Entrance into Belleek on left, continue under the arch and travel 150m to carpark on right at Ballina Athletics Track.

RVP 2 and Holding Area 2

Ballina Athletics Track.

Route from Crossmolina / Belmullet to RVP 1



Crossmolina Road Roundabout

3rd exit through roundabout onto Rockwell Road and proceed approx 300m.

Rockwell Road

Turn left, before St. Patricks Church, onto Slí Ectra Road.

Slí Ectra Road

At the end of Slí Ectra Road, turn left onto Killala Road R314. Travel 1.2km to Initial Incident Control Point, Initial On-Site Co-ordination Point, RVP 1 and Holding Area 1.

Killala Road

Approach Holding Area 1 on left, 100m before entrance to Atlantic Industries.

Holding Area 1

Killala Road Business Park.

RVP 1

At entrance gate to Atlantic Industries.

Initial Incident Control Point & Initial On-site Co-ordination Point

At Gatehouse Inside entrance gate to Atlantic Industries.

Route from Crossmolina / Belmullet to RVP 2



Crossmolina Road Roundabout

3rd exit through roundabout onto Rockwell Road and proceed approx 300m.

Rockwell Road

Turn left, before St. Patricks Church, onto Slí Ectra Road.

Slí Ectra Road

At the end of Slí Ectra Road, turn right onto Killala Road R314. Travel for 800m to Killala Road Roundabout.

Killala Road Roundabout

1st exit at roundabout onto Circular Rooad and proceed 250m to next roundabout.

Humbert Street Roundabout

2nd exit at roundabout onto Humbert St. for 150m to next roundabout. Dunnes Stores is situated on left hand side.

Arran Place Roundabout

Turn left at roundabout onto Aran Place and travel 100m. Ballina Civic Offices are situated on left hand side.

Castle Road

Turn left onto Castle Road and travel approximately 300m to entrance archway into Belleek.

Old Belleek Road

Entrance into Belleek on left, continue under the arch and travel 150m to carpark on right at Ballina Athletics Track.

RVP 2 and Holding Area 2

Ballina Athletics Track.

Route from Sligo to RVP 1



Sligo Road Roundabout

2nd exit through roundabout towards Quay Road Junction.

Quay Road

Straight through Riverslade Road Junction towards Clare St.

Lower Bridge

Turn right contra flow traffic towards Dillon Terrace.

Dillon Terrace / Emmett St. Junction

Straight through junction onto Dillon Terrace.

Dillon Terrace

Continue along Dillon Terrace and turn left onto Arran Place.



Arran Place Roundabout

2nd exit at Arran Place Roundabout onto Humbert St.

Humbert Street Roundabout

2nd exit at Humbert St. Roundabout onto Circular Road.

Killala Road Roundabout

2nd exit on roundabout onto R314 and travel 2km to Initial Incident Control Point, Initial On-Site Co-ordination Point, RVP 1 and Holding Area 1.

Route from Sligo to RVP 2



Sligo Road Roundabout

2nd exit through roundabout towards Quay Road Junction.

Quay Road

Straight through Riverslade Road Junction towards Clare St.

Lower Bridge

Turn right contra flow traffic towards Dillon Terrace.

Dillon Terrace / Emmett St. Junction

Straight through junction onto Dillon Terrace.

Dillon Terrace

Continue along Dillon Terrace and turn right onto Castle Road.

Castle Road

Turn right onto Castle Road and travel approximately 300m to entrance archway into Belleek.

Old Belleek Road

Entrance into Belleek on left, continue under the arch and travel 150m to carpark on right at Ballina Athletics Track.

RVP 2 and Holding Area 2

Ballina Athletics Track.

APPENDIX 3: INNER & OUTER CORDON FOR ATLANTIC INDUSTRIES

Map 1: Map Identifying Inner & Outer Cordons for Atlantic Industries

Map 1: Map Identifying Inner & Outer Cordons for Atlantic Industries



APPENDIX 4: TRAFFIC CORDONS

Table 1: Initial Outer Cordon Access Points Table

Table 2: Initial Traffic Cordon Points Table

Map 1: Map Identifying Traffic Cordon Point 1

Map 1: Map Identifying Traffic Cordon Points 2 - 14

Table 1: Initial Outer Cordon Access Points Table

Cordon Point	Location	Function
CP 4	Killala Road Roundabout	Traffic Control & Diversions
CP 8	Castle Road Junction	Traffic Control & Diversions
CP 13	Killala Road / Farnoo Junction	Traffic Control & Diversions
CP 14	Belleek Arch	Traffic Control & Diversions

Table 2: Initial Traffic Cordon Points Table

Cordon Point	Location	Function
CP 1	Cooneal Junction (Half Way House)	Divert Traffic to Gurteens / Crossmolina Road
CP 2	The Font, Ballina	Traffic Control & Diversions
CP 3	Fahy's Corner	Traffic Control & Diversions
CP 4	Killala Road Roundabout	Traffic Control & Diversions
CP 5	Sli Ectra Road off Killala Road	Divert Traffic to Crossmolina Road
CP 6	Humber Street Roundabout	Traffic Control – Priority to Emergency Service Vehicles
CP 7	Arran Place	Traffic Control – Priority to Emergency Service Vehicles
CP 8	Castle Road Junction	Traffic Control & Diversions
CP 9	Lower Bridge, Ballina	Direct Emergency Service Traffic Contra Flow One Way System to Dillon Terrace
CP 10	Clare Street / Cathedral Road	Direct incoming traffic onto Cathedral Road
CP 11	Riverslade Road Junction	Traffic Control – Priority to Emergency Service Vehicles
CP 12	Sligo Road Roundabout	Traffic Control – Priority to Emergency Service Vehicles
CP 13	Killala Road / Farnoo Junction	Traffic Control & Diversions
CP 14	Belleek Arch	Traffic Control & Diversions

Map 1: Map Identifying Traffic Cordon Point 1



Map 2: Map Identifying Traffic Cordon Points 2 - 14



APPENDIX 6: PRE-DESIGNATED HELICOPTER LANDING ZONES

Map 1: Pre-designated Landing Zones for Emergency Medical Service Helicopter in Ballina

Map 2: Ballina GAA Pitch (Ballina Stephenites)

Map 3: Ardnaree GAA Pitch (Ardnaree Sarsfields)

Map 4: Ballina East

Map 1: Pre-designated Landing Zones for Emergency Medical Service Helicopter in Ballina

Map 2: Pre-designated Landing Zone for Emergency Medical Service Helicopter at Ballina GAA

(Ballina Stephenites)

Ballina Gaa — 1361-AC



NOT FOR NAVIGATION

Holiste Location | ESB HV Lines 09/12 | ESB M&LV Lines 09/12 | GeoDirectory buildings

Site name	Ballina Gaa	**Site date**	April 29, 2013, 3.22 p.m.
Site ID	1361-AC	**Type**	GAA Pitch
Location	54°06'42.7"N 09°09'46.1"W	**County**	Mayo
Inspection level	Atlas/Google Maps + Airborne Recce	**OSI sheet**	None
Site contact		None	
Site comments/hazards		None	

Ballina Gaa — 24 July 2013 06:14:21 — 1361-AC

Map 3: Pre-designated Landing Zone for Emergency Medical Service Helicopter at Ardnaree GAA Pitch (Ardnaree Sarsfields)

Ardnaree Gaa 1360-AC



NOT FOR NAVIGATION

Helisite Location | ESB HV Lines 09/12 | ESB M&LV Lines 09/12 | GeoDirectory buildings

Site name	Ardnaree Gaa	**Site date**	April 29, 2013, 3.21 p.m.
Site ID	1360-AC	**Type**	GAA Pitch
Location	54°06'42.3"N 09°08'31.9"W	**County**	Mayo
Inspection level	Atlas/Google Maps + Airborne Recce	**OSI sheet**	None
Site contact		None	
Site comments/hazards		None	

Ardnaree Gaa 24 July 2013 06:14:15 1360-AC

Map 4: Pre-designated Landing Zone for Emergency Medical Service Helicopter at Ballina East

Ballina East **86-AC**



NOT FOR NAVIGATION

Hélisité Location | ESB HV Lines 09/12 | ESB M&LV Lines 09/12 | GeoDirectory buildings

Site name	Ballina East	**Site date**	Aug. 21, 2012, 2.49 p.m.
Site ID	86-AC	**Type**	Pitch
Location	54°06'52.3"N 09°08'38"W	**County**	Mayo
Inspection level	Atlas/Google Maps + Airborne Recce	**OSI sheet**	None
Site contact		None	
Site comments/hazards		None	

Ballina East 24 July 2013 04:02:11 **86-AC**

Map 1: Environmentally Sensitive Areas Map

Map 1: Environmentally Sensitive Areas Map



awnconsulting

The Tecpro Building, Clonshaugh
Business and Technology Park,
Dublin 17
T: +353 1 847 4220
F: +353 1 847 4257

Key:

Special Area of Conservation

Proposed Natural Heritage area

Special Protection Area

Client:
Atlantic Industries

Scale: 1:10,000

Sample Media Holding Statement

Sample Media Holding Statement

Holding Statement

An incident (briefly describe *(fire/explosion/leak/spill)*) took place / is imminent at Ballina Beverages, Killala Road, Ballina at (time, day and date).

An External Emergency Plan for the establishment was activated and resources from Mayo Fire Service, the HSE and An Garda Síochána were called to the scene.

Currently there are (detail number and type of emergency response units) present at the scene.

At this early stage, all our energies are concentrated on bringing the situation under control.

The public should be aware the following information:

- (If relevant) Members of the public present in the vicinity (details area) are advised to go indoors, close windows and remain indoors for now.
- Members of the public should not attend at the scene of the emergency.
- Access to the site is restricted. It is vital that all roads in the vicinity remain clear to allow emergency vehicles access to the site.
- Alternative routes and diversions are in operation and we would ask the public to observe and obey road signs in the vicinity and to listen to radio news bulletins for updates.
- Public transport routes are (affected / unaffected).
- Members of the media can contact (provide details).
- We are not in a position to comment on any medical details as yet and no interviews can be given at this time.
- Further updates will be made available as soon as possible.